At the end of 2025, Egypt announced its intention to supply natural gas to Lebanon to address its severe energy crisis. Under the gas export agreements between Israel and Egypt (the Tamar and Leviathan agreements signed in 2018), Egypt imports significant quantities of Israeli natural gas from offshore Mediterranean fields. Egypt then re-exports the gas regionally, effectively becoming a hub for Israeli energy reaching Arab markets. It should be noted that Hezbollah had also signed an agreement at the time for Leviathan.
The gas flowing from Egypt to Lebanon will likely include supplies of Israeli origin, meaning that Lebanon, a state that currently has a very weak peace agreement with Israel and was at war until a few months ago, would be indirectly purchasing Israeli energy through Egyptian intermediaries. This creates both a strategic dependence on Israeli energy infrastructure and political complications for the Lebanese government and resistance forces opposing normalization.
The most direct route uses the Arab Gas Pipeline (AGP) infrastructure: It originates in Egypt (Arish); crosses the Sinai Peninsula; crosses Jordan; continues through Syria (Homs and Hama regions); and ends in Lebanon (Tripoli, Deir Ammar power plant). The pipeline crosses approximately 300 km of Syrian territory, a critical factor for many.
The new Syrian leadership, seeking legitimacy from Western and Gulf backers, may refuse to facilitate energy flows that benefit the Hezbollah-influenced Lebanese government, strengthen political forces aligned with the resistance in Lebanon, and provide economic relief by reducing pressure on the Hezbollah basin.
And Turkey, which supports the Syrian government and has an antagonistic relationship with both Hezbollah and the current Lebanese political system, is still concerned. Ankara could pressure Damascus to block the pipeline as leverage.
But perhaps Israel has also considered this, imagining the 300 kilometers of pipeline through areas where there are opposition groups, ISIS cells in the desert regions, Russian military installations, and zones disputed between government and Turkish forces.
Background: The AGP has been repeatedly sabotaged during the Syrian conflict, with at least 14 attacks between 2011 and 2021. The new government could use “security concerns” as a pretext to block flows.
Paradoxically, Israel could oppose gas flows to Lebanon despite being an indirect supplier: Concerns for Hezbollah: Energy security strengthens the Lebanese state’s capacity, reducing pressure on Hezbollah to disarm. Israel prefers to keep Lebanon in crisis to obtain political concessions. Maritime disputes should not be underestimated, given ongoing disagreements over offshore gas fields (Karish, Qana).
Israel could pressure Egypt to cut off supplies or conditions for political change in Lebanon. The Egyptian-Lebanese gas deal faces multiple critical obstacles: Rejection of Syrian transit—most likely a blocking mechanism, given the government’s political orientation and Turkish influence. Infrastructure insecurity – sabotage by various actors on Syrian soil. Israeli interference – directly or through Egyptian pressure. Financial/sanctions complications – payment mechanisms and international restrictions. Political opposition – internal Lebanese resistance to Israeli-sourced energy.
Antonio Albanese e Graziella Giangiulio
Segui i nostri aggiornamenti su Spigolature geopolitiche: https://t.me/agc_NW e sul nostro blog Le Spigolature di AGCNEWS: https://spigolatureagcnews.blogspot.com/
