Several indicators suggest that southern Syria is entering a new phase of strategic reconfiguration. What previously appeared to be speculative geopolitical mapping is increasingly reflected in military positions, demographic fault lines, and diplomatic silences. Israel’s long-term approach in southern Syria appears less focused on temporary deterrence and more on an irreversible geographic and political reorganization.
Israel has steadily expanded its control and de facto influence over the areas adjacent to the Golan Heights, particularly Quneitra, Mount Hermon, and parts of the southwest Damascus countryside. This strategy is consistent with Israel’s long-standing doctrine of forward defense and the creation of buffer zones, rather than short-term tactical incursions.
Israeli air and artillery activity in southern Syria has been consistently documented over the past decade, officially framed as anti-Iran or anti-Hezbollah operations, but operational patterns increasingly suggest territorial reorganization and denial of access rather than mere interdiction. Israel not only denies the hostile presence but is gradually redrawing the strategic map of the south.
Playing in Israel’s favor are the Druze population of As-Suwayda, northern Quneitra, and the southern Damascus countryside, which has historically sought to maintain neutrality. However, repeated security problems, economic isolation, and reports of violence involving state and non-state actors have severely eroded the Druze’s trust in Damascus.
Open-source reporting and regional analyses indicate that some members of the Druze leadership now consider territorial connectivity between Druze areas a prerequisite for survival—politically, economically, and militarily.
This makes the concept of a land corridor connecting As-Suwayda to the Druze areas closest to the Golan Heights strategically attractive, regardless of whether it is framed as autonomy, federalism, or protection-based alignment.
Analysts monitoring the region are increasingly discussing a two-axis scenario: The Western Axis: an Israeli-supported advance or an expansion of the security zone from Quneitra and Mount Hermon eastward, bypassing the densest urban centers.
The Eastern Axis: an internal Druze mobilization or a security consolidation pushing westward from As-Suwayda.
Fundamentally, this scenario intentionally bypasses the urban centers of Daraa, reducing friction with the Sunni population centers and limiting the risk of a widespread insurrection. The operational logic suggests connection, not occupation: connecting the Druze-majority areas without governing the hostile cities.
A key risk for the Syrian government lies in being drawn into a direct confrontation with Druze forces, rather than with Israel itself. Such a conflict would: internationalize the Druze question, legitimize narratives of external “protection,” and further fracture Syria along communal lines.
Strategically, Israel would benefit if Damascus were perceived as the aggressor against minorities, while Israel positioned itself as the guarantor of stability; without formal annexation.
End scenarios (not mutually exclusive). Based on current indicators, three possible outcomes are being discussed among regional analysts: “A de facto autonomous Druze entity in southern Syria; a Druze political or security union with Israel, in the absence of formal annexation; and a Druze zone aligned with Israel that would serve as a buffer between Israel, Syria, and Jordan.”
Although the timeline remains uncertain, the direction of the movement is increasingly clear. None of these outcomes requires an immediate full-scale war; all can emerge through progressive fait accomplis.
Antonio Albanese e Graziella Giangiulio
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