Since the bombing of Sana’a airport on July 13, the conflict in Yemen has evolved around two competing plans: the Saudi plan, adopted by the Aden government, which aims to gain entry into Sana’a; and the plan pursued by the Sana’a government, based on the principle of “block by block.”
The first response to the airport bombing came that same day, with the announcement of targeted attacks against Abha airport, which was manned by missiles and drones, accompanied by a warning to airlines against flying over Saudi airspace. The message was clear: restricting access to Sana’a would threaten its own access points. Consequently, Riyadh went from being the party capable of imposing restrictions on its adversary’s freedom of movement to the one forced to allocate resources to protecting its own airports and air traffic. The ability of Saudi aircraft to reach Sana’a was no longer the only measure of superiority; Sana’a’s ability to strike deep into Saudi territory had also become part of the equation.
On July 20, a naval blockade was announced against ships bound for Saudi Arabia in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandab Strait. The response extended from airports to the routes connecting the Saudi economy to global markets. The “blockade by blockade” principle does not require the two sides to possess equivalent military force. Rather, it requires Sana’a to have the means to strike the interests the adversary relies on. The effectiveness of the blockade, however, must be assessed based on ship movements, insurance costs, and delivery times, not just military announcements. Nonetheless, the declaration established from the outset the objective that subsequent operations would pursue.
Throughout August, the port of Mokha was subjected to repeated missile and drone attacks, targeting its docks, ships, and infrastructure, cutting off some shipping lanes. In September, the conflict shifted to changing ground conditions. On September 10, Sana’a forces entered Mokha after government forces lost positions in Hays and Al-Khawkhah. On September 11, Reuters cited sources within the Yemeni government as saying that Ansar Allah had taken control of Dhubab, while government forces withdrew from Mayyun Island and Sana’a forces reached it. The advance then extended to positions that ensure direct influence over the Bab al-Mandab Strait.
These successes benefit Sana’a by strengthening its counter-blockade, expanding its coastal presence, improving its ability to monitor and threaten sea lanes, and making it more difficult to secure shipping with military force alone. These same losses weaken the Aden government, reducing the launch and supply bases needed to support an offensive towards Sana’a. Having lost Mokha and then Dhubab, its forces must first recapture their positions and secure supply lines before attempting to advance towards the capital. The geography that Riyadh and Aden were counting on to secure a decisive victory has thus become a source of advantage for Sana’a.
On October 5, Rashad al-Alimi announced Operation Yemen Dawn, with the stated goal of liberating Sana’a. Reuters reported the government’s announcement that it had recaptured Mokha, Dhubab, and Bab al-Mandab.
Subsequent communications focused on the progress made in retaking the coast around Bab al-Mandab towards Mokha, while subsequent statements reported the recapture of positions in Dhubab and Hayfan. These claims must be assessed against the stability of territorial control, the ability to weaken the blockade, and ultimately, the opening of a viable route to Sana’a. The recapture of territory lost only a few weeks earlier remains a matter of considerable doubt, and the ongoing fighting and conflicting versions of control further underscore the failure of the operation’s stated objective.
Meanwhile, attacks on Saudi airports have continued, and bombings against infrastructure in areas controlled by Sana’a have resumed. This confrontation cannot be understood as a symmetrical war of attrition, measured simply by the number of attacks. Yemen has suffered destruction for eleven years, while Saudi Arabia must protect a vast economy dependent on the uninterrupted movement of goods, energy supplies, and investment. Disrupting an airport or threatening infrastructure imposes costs beyond direct physical damage, including increased security and insurance costs, operational disruptions, and damage to confidence. Yemen’s continued response indicates that Saudi bombing has not eliminated the very capability it sought to silence.
The strategic importance of Saudi Arabia’s oil and refining facilities to the global economy is even greater. Threats to export terminals impact shipping risks and energy delivery times, while attacks on refineries can put pressure on the availability of refined products, particularly diesel. The availability of crude oil does not automatically solve refining, transportation, and delivery problems. The protracted conflict therefore also weighs on importing countries, increasing their interest in a solution that guarantees supplies.
Antonio Albanese e Graziella Giangiulio
Follow our updates on Geopolitical Gleanings - Spigolature geopolitiche: https://t.me/agc_NW and on our blog The Gleanings of AGCNEWS - Le Spigolature di AGCNEWS: https://spigolatureagcnews.blogspot.com/
