A recent analysis by the Israeli research institute Alma describes a “Hezbollah state” within the Lebanese state. According to the research, Hezbollah manages its civilian activities in Lebanon through a structure of “areas” and “sectors.” Although Lebanon is officially divided into nine administrative regions, Hezbollah has divided the country into five areas: the two southern areas, known as the “First Area” of Jabal Amel and the “Second Area” of Jabal Amel; the Beirut area, designated as the “Third Area”; the Bekaa area, designated as the “Fourth Area”; and the Mount Lebanon and North Lebanon area, designated as the “Fifth Area” (see details below).
The Area Manager (*mas’ul mantiqa*) is Hezbollah’s main civilian representative within a geographical area encompassing several local “sectors.” The role involves coordination tasks, participation in ceremonies, meetings with local leadership, and representing Hezbollah’s positions in the Lebanese public and civil sphere.
The Sector Manager (*mas’ul qita’*) operates in a more limited territorial scope, maintaining contacts with municipal authorities , *mukhtar* (village or neighborhood heads), institutions, religious figures, associations and political actors.
Area and Sector Officers enable Hezbollah to maintain constant contact with local society and help meet the population’s needs. In this way, they increase Hezbollah’s influence, strengthen its standing among the Lebanese public — particularly within its base — and consolidate its presence in citizens’ daily lives. While not military officials or commanders, their activities support the “resistance society,” which is the basis for Hezbollah’s military operations.
The Area and Sector Leaders represent a key component of the “Hezbollah State” operating within the Lebanese state. They play a crucial role in the organization’s civilian infrastructure, which supports the daily life of the Shiite base and provides services — sometimes quasi-state-level — taking advantage of the Lebanese government’s chronic weakness.
Hezbollah’s civilian infrastructure is its true “game changer.” It represents much more than a simple support mechanism for the organization: it is one of the fundamental sources of strength that allows its survival as a military force.
Hezbollah divides Lebanese territory into five areas: the two areas of southern Lebanon, Jabal Amel (in red); Beirut (in green); the Bekaa (in yellow); and Mount Lebanon and the North (in white).
In the south, the “First Area” of Jabal Amel (the red portion on the map, south of the Litani River) corresponds to the area of southern Lebanon located south of the river itself. A September 2025 statement, released by Hezbollah’s media outlets, listed eight sectors within this area: Tyre, al-Qasmiya, al-Sahel, Qana, Jouaya, al-Hujair, Bint Jbeil, and Khiam.
The “Second Area” of Jabal Amel (the red portion on the map, north of the Litani River) corresponds to the area of southern Lebanon located north of the river. It includes the areas of Sidon, al-Zahrani, Jebsheet, Iqlim al-Tuffah, Nabatieh, and al-Shaqif.
According to the geographical division adopted by Hezbollah, the Western Bekaa sector also falls within the ” Second Area” of Jabal Amel, rather than the Bekaa area. In July 2025, the municipal affairs apparatus of the ” Second Area” of Jabal Amel organized a meeting with the *mukhtar* (village/neighborhood heads) of the Western Bekaa, which was attended by the head of the sector, Hassan Hisham ( حسان Also a document illustrating the reconstruction activities of the organization « Jihad al-Binaa » ( جهادالبناء ) places the western Bekaa sector within the “ Second Area” of Jabal Amel.
Although the Litani River generally separates Hezbollah’s two southern areas, it cannot be considered a precise organizational boundary. For example, although Bint Jbeil and Nabatieh both formally belong to the Nabatieh region, Hezbollah has placed them in separate southern areas.
The ” Third Area”, that of Beirut (in green), includes the city of Beirut, its southern suburbs (the *Dahieh*) and, apparently, also the coastal strip of northern Metn ( ساحلالمتن Hezbollah’s ” Fourth Area ” in the Bekaa (in yellow) includes several official regions: the Bekaa region, the Baalbek region, and the Hermel region. Similarly, Hezbollah’s ” Fifth Area ,” covering Mount Lebanon and the North (in white), includes four official Lebanese regions: Mount Lebanon, Jbeil and Keserwan, the North, and Akkar.
The mapping of these officials was developed based on local Arabic reports regarding their activities , including meetings with municipal administrators and mukhtars (village leaders), visits to institutions, events organized by various Lebanese political parties, social and welfare initiatives, and election campaigns. Within these reports, Alma searched for explicit references linking the name of an official to their role and the Area or Sector of responsibility, cross-referencing publications from different dates. This also allowed us to identify individuals who held certain positions even in the absence of an official announcement of their appointment.
The public activities of these officials connect Hezbollah’s ongoing operations to civilian life at the local community level. The Area Director helps define an agenda that involves numerous agencies and institutions, while the Sector Director often interacts directly with local stakeholders.
At the Area level, a significant example is represented by a meeting, documented in October 2026, between Abdullah Nasser ( عبد الله (ناصر ), responsible for the “ First Area ” of Jabal Amel, and the leaders of 29 municipalities in the south. During the meeting , the work plans for 2027 – concerning water, electricity and road services – were discussed , as well as coordination with the bodies dealing with municipal issues and assistance to displaced residents. This role gives the Area Manager a position of considerable importance with respect to local and government authorities , making him a full interlocutor in discussions on the needs of the territory. In effect, the Lebanese state is collaborating with a figure who has no formal status within the state legal system, nor any legal authority recognized by it.
At the sector level, the interaction is more limited and targeted. For example, in October 2026, Hussein Suleiman ( حسينSheikh Wahid Hawi ( ), head of the Qana Sector, met with representatives of the Rshaf municipality to discuss the needs of residents and displaced persons. In January 2026, Sheikh Wahid Hawi ( وحيدHawi , head of the Jouaya Sector, attended a meeting of the association of mukhtars (village leaders) of Jouaya and surrounding towns. The agenda focused on administrative and service delivery issues; at the meeting, Hawi called for greater coordination with local electoral committees. Both examples illustrate the connection between these officials and the institutions that represent residents’ concerns.
During election campaigns, these figures are actively involved in the formation of electoral lists and in negotiating agreements at the local level. In May 2025, the Hadath-Baalbek municipal council issued a message of thanks to Hassan Hamieh ( حسن حمية ), responsible for the Western Baalbek Sector – together with Hezbollah and the Amal movement – for their contribution to reaching the agreement that made the election of the council possible . In the same month, Abbas Mazloum ( عباس Hussein al-Nimr (), head of the Brital Sector, took part in the presentation of a local electoral list. These incidents testify to the role played by these officials in the local electoral arena. The organization also has a local presence, thanks to ties with institutions that offer services to the civilian population. In October 2026, Dr. Hussein al-Nimr ( النمر ), Hezbollah’s official for the Bekaa area, attended the inauguration of some clinics at al-Batoul hospital in Hermel, pledging to support their development.
The participation of officials in social events also has an ideological significance. In January 2026, Hussein Fadlallah ( حسينفضلAli Daoun ( ), Hezbollah’s official for the Beirut area, sponsored an event in honor of the wounded, organized by the union of Dahieh municipalities. In the same month, Ali Daoun ( عليAl-Aqsa ), head of the ” Second Area ” in Jabal Amel, spoke at a gathering of the Imam al-Mahdi Scouts , emphasizing the movement’s contribution to religious and value education. Such initiatives give public visibility to Hezbollah’s concept of ” resistance , ” integrating it into the activities of local institutions.
Sector managers also sometimes intervene in dispute resolution. In August 2026, Bilal Dagher ( بلال داغر ), head of the al-Jabal sector, reportedly took part – together with a representative of the Amal movement – in a reconciliation committee in Khaldeh. The committee submitted an agreement reached between the families involved to the Supreme Shiite Islamic Council.
This widespread and active commitment to the civilian population responds to the organization’s objectives : to consolidate its presence, create forms of dependency, indoctrinate the population and build a base of support.
The importance of these officials goes beyond their role within the organization . They help maintain Hezbollah’s ties with its core constituency and, more broadly, with the entire population of each area or sector, strengthening the movement’s position as a participating actor in community life.
Through these channels, Hezbollah positions itself as an almost exclusive point of reference for the needs of the civilian population. In this way, the organization supports the so-called “resistance society,” whose existence is, in turn, the prerequisite that makes the movement’s military activity possible. Case study : Sheikh Zayd Daher, head of the Sidon sector for Hezbollah.
Zayd Daher ( زيد ضاهر ), originally from Sidon, is a long-time representative of the organization at the local level. As early as July 2010, local media reported him as a senior Hezbollah official in Sidon; the same role was attributed to him in documents dating back to September 2026.
Antonio Albanese e Graziella Giangiulio
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