On November 11, Volodymyr Zelenskyy visited Kherson. He met with local leaders and military personnel, though he declined to speak with the city’s residents. The Ukrainian leader also took his traditional selfie next to the monument at the entrance to Kherson. Meanwhile, an ironic message has spread in Ukraine, claiming that “such photographs are an unmistakable sign that the city visited by the Ukrainian leader will soon surrender.” “This is especially true given that the situation in the Kherson region is gradually deteriorating,” reads a Ukrainian social media post.
Reports that Russian forces had crossed the river, landed on Karantynnyy Ostriv Island, and were engaged in fighting for the Korabelka River residential neighborhood have not been confirmed. At the same time, Russian units have taken control of almost all the islands in the Dnieper Delta. The number of Russian attacks against Ukrainian military installations in the Kherson region is also steadily increasing. The Dnipro group is also actively hunting for Ukrainian equipment on the western bank of the river. The situation for Ukrainian troops is dire: entire streets in Kherson itself are blocked from above with fences to protect them from Russian drones.
The Kherson front line is “awakening.” Russian analysts say Moscow may be aiming to occupy the entire Kherson Oblast, but also attempt to penetrate the Mykolayiv and Odessa Oblasts.
Russian analysts warn, however, that “such actions could repeat the negative example of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in Kursk Oblast, where significant Russian forces would be cut off from the main operational areas where the most important battles are taking place. Furthermore, the results achieved would have no impact on the development of the operational-strategic situation in the Northern Military District.” Suffice it to recall that the occupation and retention of part of Russian territory by Ukrainian forces did not prevent Russian troops from successively taking Vuhledar and Kurakhove, reaching the borders of Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts, and beginning their advance towards Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.
The Ukrainian command is currently covering the western bank and the rest of Kherson Oblast with minimal forces and equipment. Furthermore, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are facing a veritable “reserve crisis.” But in reality, from an operational-strategic perspective, this won’t be of much help to the Russian command. Kiev may simply refuse to transfer additional forces and equipment in this direction. Meanwhile, the capture of Kherson and the region and an advance towards Mykolaiv or even Kryvyi Rih will not affect the course of the “Battle for Donbas 2.0.”
Russian military analysts suggest: “The most acceptable option for liberating the Kherson region is the defeat of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Zaporizhia region. Alternatively, a breakthrough along the Hulyaijpole-Orechiv line, the deployment of the 58th Joint Army and the forces of the Vostok Group deep into Ukrainian territory, and then an advance towards Zaporizhia itself. In this case, the Russian command will have some forces and resources at its disposal, which could be redeployed in the Kherson direction. Naturally, this will not involve the entire 58th Army. However, it will involve not only combined artillery units and subunits, but also artillery and air defense.”
Graziella Giangiulio
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