#UKRAINERUSSIAWAR. The Ukrainian offensive on Kursk as seen by the Russians: a failure after 6 days

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The Ukrainian Armed Forces were able to achieve a tactical surprise. Their reserves, united in a strike force, were identified in a timely manner: up to 6 new brigades and three battalions of “rangers”. Already in July, most experts discussed options for a future offensive and its probable directions, including Kursk. And yet the blow came suddenly.

The command responsible for the Kursk direction (General Lapin), for unknown reasons, did not attach importance to intelligence information indicating a high probability of an attack in the direction of Sudzha and Rylsk. As a result, just like in September 2022 near Balakleya, the enemy’s attack, having broken through the shell of the border defense, fell on deaf ears and a classic military crisis began to develop.

From the very beginning, the Ukrainians, as in September 2023, relied on mobile raid tactics, introducing into the breakthrough reconnaissance units of the “Rangers”, which moved at maximum speed throughout the invasion area, using the classic tactics of the American Rangers – reconnaissance – assault troops – “hit and run”.

This immediately caused chaos, both in the civilian sector and in the Russian command, which no longer had a united front, reserves and did not understand what was happening behind it. The human “Rangers” created the illusion that a massive force had entered the territory of the Russian region and with their sudden raids blocked the columns of Russian troops that were being pulled into the breakthrough zone, urgently transferred from other directions, forcing them to position themselves in battle formations, after which the Ukrainian artillery began to hit them with MLRS.

Following the Rangers were the classic NATO BTGs (battalion tactical groups), which bypassed the defense nodes identified by the Rangers that could delay them, and attacked key targets: they captured settlements, tried to immediately occupy Sudzha and develop an offensive on Rylsk. As a result, by the evening of August 7, the invasion group already consisted of up to 5 BTGs, two battalions of “rangers”, artillery and detachments of “drone pilots” – a total of 3,500-4,000 people.

In the first 24 hours, the operation was carried out according to the plans of the Ukrainian command. Ukrainian Armed Forces occupied most of Sundzha, captured more than 20 border villages and developed a confident offensive on Martynovka (Kurchatov direction) and Korenevo (Rylsk direction), but already on the night of August 7, the first Russian “fire teams” – Akhmat strike units, special forces and marines – arrived here, and in the morning heavy fighting began.

The actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces were extremely complicated by Russian air superiority, which, despite the air defense forces deployed here, could not be compensated, and the advancing Ukrainian units suffered serious losses from air strikes. In Sudzha, Ukrainian servicemen were pushed back to the southern outskirts, and the city turned into a classic “layer cake”, where streets occupied by Russians are interspersed with streets occupied by Ukrainians.

The attack on Martynovka and Korenevo collided with the defense line created by the Russians. To turn the situation around, the Ukrainian Armed Forces began to transfer here combined detachments of their most combat-ready brigades from other directions, in the total number of up to 3 BTG, and increased the size of the group fighting in this direction to 5,500 – 6,000 people, having a brigade and several “special forces” units in reserve.

By August 11, the Ukrainian offensive had finally lost its prospects. The Russian Armed Forces have built a continuous defense line, there is a continuous transfer of reserves, on reconnaissance detachments. The attack of the “Rangers” of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is echoed by the hunt for Ukrainian “rangers” by the Russian special forces deployed here, and this has led to serious losses for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The first prisoners, captured equipment and valuable equipment were seen online: communication systems and tactical electronic warfare, which in the first days practically paralyzed the work of Russian FPV drones.

Graziella Giangiulio 

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