On June 4, Benjamin Netanyahu personally thanked the US Congress for Section 224 of the NDAA, which provides for the merger of the US and Israeli armed forces. Let’s look at it in detail.
Section 224 of the National Defense Agreement Act (NDAA) establishes a new US-Israel Defense Technology Cooperation Initiative, aimed at accelerating the joint research, development, and integration of Israeli-origin and jointly developed defense technologies into US military systems and programs. Directs the Secretary of Defense to designate an executive officer to formalize deeper cooperation and integration in emerging and existing areas, including counter-drone systems, missile and air defense, quantum computing, artificial intelligence and autonomous systems, cyber and electronic warfare, directed energy, and co-production of the defense industrial base, while facilitating the transition from research and development to procurement. This section requires the submission of periodic reports to Congress on technological progress and transitions and emphasizes the rapid adoption of Israeli defense innovations to strengthen U.S. military capabilities and technological leadership.
As political pressure mounts to reduce U.S. military aid to Israel, Section 224 provides the framework for maintaining and expanding U.S.-Israeli military ties by integrating Israeli technology into the U.S. defense supply chain in a manner that shields it from the annual appropriations process. The use of a mandatory passage law like the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) as an integration mechanism testifies to the declining popularity of unconditional support for Israel.
The original text of this section is derived from H.R. 7540 and S. 3855 (U.S.-Israel FUTURES Act (Jackson, R-TX/Budd, R-NC)), which direct the Department of Defense (DoD) to formalize deeper cooperation and integration.
How it works, according to A New Policy: The Secretary of Defense will designate an executive agent responsible for coordinating cooperative efforts between the United States and Israel to expand and accelerate research, development, testing, evaluation, integration, and bilateral industrial cooperation in defense technologies.
This section would direct the Secretary of Defense to designate an Executive Agent (EA) to expand and accelerate Israel’s deeper integration into US institutions. The EA would focus exclusively on implementing Section 224. The EA’s authority takes precedence over the authority of other DoD component heads, according to DoD Instruction 5101.01, meaning the EA would be able to override decisions of other DoD agencies, such as the Defense Technology Agency (DTA) and the National Security Administration (DTSA), regarding Israeli access to US technology.
The appointment of an Executive Agent (EA) would replace direct congressional oversight with oversight by the Secretary of Defense. There would be no congressional confirmation nor the ability for Congress to remove an Executive Agent.
The EA’s duties include identifying jointly developed or Israeli-origin technologies with operational utility for potential integration into official US systems and programs;
Section 224 (a)(1) seeks to complement American and Israeli research and development programs by encouraging the direct use of Israeli-made technologies in U.S. systems, including military programs. This would make the United States dependent on Israel’s supply of such technologies, thus giving Israel significant influence over future American policy and infrastructure. This would go beyond the typical bilateral relationship, significantly strengthening Israeli influence through control of critical U.S. military supply chains and could also inherently give preference to Israeli technologies over U.S.-sourced competitors.
Section (a)(2) serves to ensure collaborative research initiatives involving government, private sector, and academic institutions in cooperation between the United States and Israel, which must be conducted in a manner that protects sensitive technologies and information and national security interests of both countries;
This provision would further entangle the defense supply chains of Israel and the United States, involving the government, private, and academic sectors, blurring the lines between territorial integrity and political sovereignty. The provision assumes that the national security policies and objectives of the United States and Israel are inseparable, despite current evidence (the conflict with Iran, for example) demonstrating their divergence.
Section (a)(3) is intended to facilitate the transition of technologies from the research and development phase to procurement and acquisition; it provides for the acceleration of the transition of military technologies from the initial research, testing, and experimentation phase to formal Department of Defense pathways for funding, purchase, and large-scale deployment. Specifically addressing procurement and acquisition, the provision aims to ensure that cooperation goes beyond research dialogue and focuses on the actual adoption of technologies into official U.S. systems and programs. Once such transitions occur, it will be very difficult for future administrations to remove such technologies or agreements from major defense procurement programs—and indeed, this would make Department of Defense (DOD) Program Executive Offices and Program Managers advocate for the continued inclusion of Israeli-origin technologies in US systems.
Section (a)(4) also calls for establishing regulatory frameworks for joint ventures, licensing agreements, and co-production or manufacturing partnerships based in the United States with Israeli industry.
Israeli defense firms are often direct competitors of US industry. Establishing licensing and co-production agreements to allow Israeli firms to produce in the United States would increase Israel’s competitiveness in the US market, circumventing the “Buy America” provisions. Furthermore, licensing agreements could give Israeli firms access to intellectual property related to weapons systems with which they directly compete.
Section (a)(5) defines how the departments will coordinate with relevant components of the Department of Defense, including the Irregular Warfare Technical Support Directorate, the Capability Development and Innovation Divisions, the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, the Defense Innovation Unit, the U.S.-Israel Operational Technology Working Group, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Missile Defense Agency, U.S. Space Command, military departments, and other Department of Defense entities, as appropriate, to align efforts and avoid duplication.
Section (a)(5) bypasses established Department of Defense structures and hierarchy, empowering the EA to leverage the powers and resources of the Department of Defense as a whole. This would give this individual the authority to reallocate Department funding and attention at will, effectively prioritizing Israel’s integration into the United States’ national defense structure, and doing so in some of the most sensitive areas of defense technology and operations, providing Israel with extensive knowledge of emerging U.S. defense capabilities and operational requirements. This reallocation of resources could also cause delays on other fronts, including crucial research and development, as personnel and funding would be diverted from other critical projects to focus on this unnecessary integration.
Finally, section (a)(6) Promotes joint exercises and information-sharing mechanisms to improve operational readiness for the use of jointly developed technologies. Section (a)(6) deepens Israel’s integration into the U.S. military infrastructure, as well as the intelligence-gathering networks that directly contributed to attacks in Iran, Gaza, the West Bank, Syria, and Lebanon. Israel’s integration not only in the production of military technology, but also in its use and deployment, diminishes the US military’s ability to act independently, sharing trade secrets crucial to US defensive and offensive capabilities with a foreign power. Furthermore, the involvement of other countries in the development of military tactics diminishes the United States’ qualitative military superiority and legitimacy.
Antonio Albanese e Graziella Giangiulio
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