An interesting analysis by an OSINT team appeared on the social media platform covering Middle Eastern issues. The article states: “The Iranian issue has deepened internal rifts within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), revealing that its member states have divergent approaches toward Iran, the United States, and Israel.”
At the same time, the vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz and energy infrastructure has exposed the limits of the US security umbrella. Consequently, the future of the Persian Gulf will be shaped less by strategic integration and more by rivalries, disagreements, and the efforts of individual states to secure their interests through different paths.
In recent years, the GCC countries had adopted a strategy based on neutrality, balance, and mediation between Iran and the United States. Despite extensive security ties with Washington, they have avoided direct involvement in military conflicts, with countries such as Oman and Qatar playing a key mediating role.
However, doubts about the effectiveness of the US security umbrella have gradually grown, from Washington’s limited response to the 2019 attacks to the erosion of deterrence following the events of 2025, when not even the presence of major US bases prevented Qatar from being targeted by an Israeli attack. In this regard, it is noteworthy how, for example, Naftal Bennett, Israeli presidential candidate and former Prime Minister, consistently accuses Qatar of being behind the October 7, 2023, attack and calls for serious intervention against the country in every television interview.
At the same time, Iran has used the presence of these bases as part of the justification for its own attacks. These developments have led to a reassessment of the costs and benefits of hosting US security assets, and three key divisions within the GCC—trust in the United States, the role of Israel, and the approach toward Iran—have solidified as the main lines of strategic disagreement.
The GCC states have found themselves directly at the center of the conflict, with 83% of Iranian missile and drone attacks directed against them. Regional energy and logistics infrastructure have also been targeted, and the Strait of Hormuz has been effectively transformed into a tool of geopolitical pressure. The war has demonstrated that, despite efforts at economic diversification, the region’s structural dependence on hydrocarbons (about 30% of GDP and up to 85% of public revenue) and food imports (85% of food needs) remains intact. This means that a potential crisis in Hormuz could trigger severe recessions (with GDP falling by up to 14% in some countries).
Politically, things are no better: GCC unity has appeared more fragile than ever; member states’ reactions to Iran, the United States, and Israel have been mixed, and strategic divisions have widened. The result has been the coexistence of multiple divergent approaches within a shared crisis: some have leaned toward limited security cooperation, others toward a balance with Iran, and still others toward closer alignment with the United States and the Zionist regime.
Finally, analysts state: “In future scenarios for the Persian Gulf following the war with Iran, three main trajectories are conceivable: in a pessimistic scenario, the pressure of war pushes the GCC countries toward more genuine cooperation, creating practical convergence in areas such as joint air defense, weapons production, and the interconnection of economic infrastructure such as rail and energy networks, while simultaneously increasing the likelihood of a direct confrontation with Iran.” See the recent Saudi Arabia-Pakistan-Iran agreement.
The second, more likely scenario is that cooperation remains limited to crisis management and limited security coordination, with disagreements over the roles of the United States, Israel, and Iran, as well as the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, impeding strategic integration.
Finally, “in an optimistic scenario, regional rivalries, particularly between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, intensify, and the countries adopt separate strategies toward Iran and the United States, resulting in increased fragmentation within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), an arms race, and political divergences. The United Arab Emirates are likely to enter into direct conflict; Oman will adopt a firm stance against Israel and a critical attitude toward US intervention; Kuwait and Bahrain will passively follow US directives; and Saudi Arabia will maintain neutrality, waiting for the right moment to strike at the interests of Iran, the UAE, and their allies.”
Antonio Albanese e Graziella Giangiulio
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