In Iran, on August 29, 30, and 31, reports emerged from private citizens regarding the receipt of messages in Persian on mobile devices, which concerned the authorities. In the initial phase, the language of the messages was entirely fluid and social; they spoke of economic pressure, the devaluation of currency, corruption, fear, and the gap between people’s lives and the structure of the Revolutionary Guards. Essentially, it was an invitation to anyone feeling economic pressure to come forward, including members of the armed forces, or to distance themselves from them.
However, in the reports received by the authorities on the morning of August 31, the nature of the message changed and became more performance-oriented. As Iranian OSINT units write: “It’s no longer just ‘distance yourself from the Revolutionary Guards’; the public is faced with a concrete offer: ‘If you want to help end the conflict, you must provide information on the location of personnel and equipment in exchange for a financial reward.'”
This shift is the most sensitive part of the US media campaign. It’s because the message shifts from the “mind-influencing” phase to the “request for information” phase. In other words, it first attempts to create a motivation—economic pressure, anger, or political distance—and then offers the public a clear path to cooperation.
The website referenced in these messages is based on the US program Rewards for Justice, which has a dedicated page on “Top Revolutionary Guards Leaders” and has announced a reward of up to $10 million for information about them. Furthermore, CENTCOM and the US Department of War have created a separate page for 40 Revolutionary Guards commanders.
The issue isn’t just the reward amount. In the section dedicated to submitting information, the public is asked to provide their data and, if available, upload photos, videos, and documents to support their report. Various communication channels, including a Tor-based channel, were considered for receiving information. Therefore, the public reporting—”provide information and receive a reward”—is at least consistent with the existence of an official and active American intelligence gathering infrastructure.
From an intelligence perspective, the importance of such a system doesn’t necessarily lie in finding a “leading informant.” Hundreds of small tips may not be valuable in themselves; but a new photo, the sighting of a vehicle, a change in the location of a facility, or confirmation of an individual’s presence, when considered alongside satellite data, intercepts, commercial imagery, and other sources, can confirm or deny previous data. This is where the line between psychological operations and human-led intelligence gathering becomes blurred. The same message that’s supposed to influence the public’s mind can simultaneously turn it into a potential source of information.
The final link in this chain is timing. A few days ago, after several weeks of pause, the United States launched another strike in the Strait of Hormuz, targeting launchers that, according to the US command, were preparing for operations. Iran, in response, fired missiles at US installations in Jordan.
This event in itself does not prove that the reports or information submitted to the reward program were directly used in selecting attack targets; there is no evidence to support such a claim. But from a military perspective, one thing is clear: the closer we get to the start of operations, the more valuable the new information becomes.
A target database can exist for months; the problem is its “obsolescence.” A commander moves, equipment moves, a headquarters is evacuated, and a secondary point suddenly gains importance. For this reason, before an operation, the issue is not just identifying the target; the most important issue is verifying the target.
In such circumstances, even a small human clue, if correlated with satellite imagery, intercepts, or other sensors, can update part of the picture. If a large-scale conflict breaks out, it’s logical that in the first wave, efforts to disrupt the command, communication, and decision-making cycle will become crucial. This is important because the effect of such an attack isn’t limited to eliminating The goal is not to target a target, but to slow down the entire network’s reaction.
Therefore, this set of messages should not be considered simply a “propaganda campaign.” What should be monitored is the simultaneity of three trends: an increase in messages and requests for information in Persian, an increase in reconnaissance and surveillance activities, and signs of military preparation.
According to Iranian analysts: “If these three curves increase simultaneously, we are no longer dealing with a simple media message, but rather with a warning signal warning of an escalation. And an important consideration: we must not fall into the trap of psychological operations. The fact that the opposing side claims to have “influence everywhere” does not mean that it actually has such dominance. This is precisely the analytical work: separating real capacity from the image the enemy wants to project of its own.”
Antonio Albanese e Graziella Giangiulio
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