Israel Army Radio explained how Hamas managed to destroy so many Merkava 4 tanks: “It was revealed that Hamas had collected accurate intelligence on Merkava 4 tanks over the years, gained access to sensitive materials, and through them created an ‘armored force’ of elite personnel trained to drive and operate Merkava 4 tanks, relying on them to plan part of the October 7th attack on the sector.”
In investigating the failure after October 7th, the Israeli military discovered that Hamas had managed to disable tanks in the Gaza sector and attempted to control and relocate them within the sector. In the October 7 attack, Hamas elements managed to disable tanks in the Gaza sector and render them unusable; the militants knew of a “secret” button inside the tank, which, when pressed, would temporarily disable it.
It was discovered that Hamas had collected sensitive information from Israeli soldiers’ social media accounts and, by following tens of thousands of soldiers, obtained valuable information through photos and videos from bases and locations; through materials from an armored corps training base; and even used clips uploaded by soldiers during exercises inside the tank. Using this wealth of sensitive information, Hamas developed a comprehensive plan. A force of elite elements trained as “tank crews” and equipped with life-size models of Merkava tanks and an advanced simulation program to teach them how to operate them.
A military correspondent for Israel Army Radio stated, “This force was part of the plans to attack settlements in the Gaza Strip and Israeli army positions on October 7, 2023.”
The military correspondent for Israel Army Radio also stated, “Hamas managed to include fake accounts in Israeli army WhatsApp groups, such as ‘Egoz Recruits.’ This is how they tracked people for years until they became officers and commanders. Imagine Hamas tracking a person from the moment they assume the role of platoon commander until they become a company commander, thus maintaining a complete record of almost every company or battalion in the Israeli army.” “Hamas was not content to monitor general accounts; it created “avatar” accounts through high-level social engineering, turning them into Facebook friends and Instagram followers for soldiers and officers whose social media accounts were identified as private or closed.”
According to Israeli Army Radio, Hamas operated a large-scale intelligence network for five years, in which approximately 2,500 activists monitored nearly 100,000 IDF soldiers on social media. The organization used fake “avatar” accounts and introduced “shadow users” into military WhatsApp groups to monitor soldiers from recruitment to command assignments. Through millions of posts, photos, and videos, many from bases, Hamas produced a daily intelligence picture of force deployments, sensitive unit locations, and changes in military routines. The combination of materials allowed it to build detailed models of locations, including 3D simulations and virtual reality goggles for infiltration training. Hamas also built physical models of bases in the Gaza Strip. Army officers testify that their level of accuracy was much higher than the initial estimates.
Following the conclusion of the investigation, on November 23, IDF Chief of Staff Zamir summoned senior officers to inform them of the findings of the October 7 investigation and stated, “We will not be mistaken.” Some retired army officers, invited to a meeting with the Chief of Staff regarding the October 7 findings, did not show up.
Officers summoned by Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir: Air Force Commander Tomer Bar; Navy Commander David Saar Salma; Former AMAN chief Oded Basiuk; Former AMAN chief Aharon Haliva; Former Southern Command chief Yaron Finkelman; Former Gaza Division commander Avi Rosenfeld; Current AMAN chief Shlomi Binder (who was in charge of operations on October 7); Officers with the rank of major general and colonel were summoned by the Chief of Staff. Eyal Zamir; Officers with the rank of colonel were summoned by Deputy Chief of Staff Tamir Yadai. Among them was the Southern Command’s intelligence officer on October 7, Colonel Ariel Lapovsky.
The Government Coordinator in the Territories, General Ghassan Alian, whose unit was not investigated for its role on October 7, was not summoned for a meeting with the Chief of Staff, and no personal measures are expected to be taken against him at this stage. This comes after the investigative unit was not investigated and the commission chaired by retired General Sami Turgeman decided that its role in the failure should be investigated.
Following a series of meetings between IDF Chief of Staff General Eyal Zamir and Deputy Chief of Staff General Tamir Yadai, with senior and junior officers of the IDF, Zamir announced the mass dismissal and reprimand of over a dozen senior officers and other military officials for their misconduct in the period leading up to October 7, 2023. Among them: the former head of the Military Intelligence Directorate, General Aharon Haliva, who resigned in August 2024, will be dismissed from the reserve and expelled from the IDF. The former head of the Operations Directorate, General Odet Basiuk, who terminated his service in July, will be dismissed from the reserve and expelled from the IDF.
The former commander of the IDF Southern Command, General Yaron Finkelman, resigned in March and will be dismissed from the reserve and expelled from the IDF. The current head of the Military Intelligence Directorate, General Shlomo Binder, who served as head of the Operations Division on October 7, received a reprimand but will continue in that position until the end of his four-year term in 2028, after which he will leave the IDF.
The current head of the Israeli Air Force, Major General Tomer Bar, will be reprimanded for failing to provide protection against the infiltration of Hamas-controlled drones and paragliders on October 7. He will continue to serve until the end of his term in April 2026. The commander-in-chief of the Israeli Navy, Vice Admiral David Sa’ar Salama, will be reprimanded for failing to provide protection against the Hamas naval attack on southern Israel on October 7. He will continue to serve until early 2026.
Brigadier General “Gimmel,” who on October 7 was head of the Operations Department of the Military Intelligence Directorate, will be retired from the IDF. The former commander of Israeli Intelligence Unit 8200, Brigadier General Yossi Sariel, will be dismissed from the reserve and expelled from the IDF. The former commander of the 143rd Division (the Gaza Division), Brigadier General Avi Rosenfeld, will be dismissed from the reserve and expelled from the IDF. The former intelligence chief of the IDF Southern Command, Colonel Ariel Lubowski, will be dismissed from the reserve and expelled from the IDF. Colonel Haim Cohen, commander of the Northern Brigade of the Gaza Division during the events of October 7, will be dismissed from the reserve and expelled from the IDF. Lieutenant Colonel “Alef,” head of Gaza Division intelligence, will be dismissed from the IDF.
Furthermore, Zamir ruled that there are no obstacles to the promotion of Brigadier General Eliad Moati, Brigadier General Manor Yanai, and Colonel Efraim Avni, after Defense Minister Israel Katz decided to suspend their appointments due to allegations of their possible involvement in the October 7 failure.
Antonio Albanese e Graziella Giangiulio
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