After the presentation of the IDF investigations into what happened on October 7, the Shin Bet report is awaited, which has not yet been made public. In the newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth Yossi Yehoshua writes: “The Shin Bet has not yet presented the results of the investigation. This behavior is exasperating because the Shin Bet’s responsibility in terms of intelligence is exactly the same as that of the army, yet the amount of material it has to process is much less. All this at a time when the political leaders not only did not investigate its actions on Saturday and the day before, but also did everything in their power to prevent the creation of an official commission of inquiry”.
The journalist continues: “The investigations that the IDF has presented to the public are late, contain little data and are fundamentally very problematic. The reasons are many, but the result is the same: the outgoing Chief of Staff, Herzi Halevy, delayed the summary of the investigations and then proceeded to publish them all at once, in a way that made it difficult for the public to delve into them.”
Also in Yedioth Ahronoth we read: “During the battle with Hamas in the spring of 2021, Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi promoted to himself and the public a narrative of victory and deterrence. Even Netanyahu boasted: ‘We have changed the equation.’ The basic principle was that Hamas had received a severe blow, that the tunnel project had been virtually destroyed and that the completion of the underground obstacle had minimized the risk of infiltration into Israel. Therefore, Hamas will seek calm, economic development and a solution. But on the other hand, Hamas sees a completely different picture: from its perspective, it has managed to surprise with intelligence, to trigger fronts (even inside mixed cities in “Israel”) and to survive another round without a clash on the ground. The Israeli army and Shin Bet intelligence services are not aware of this trend, or perhaps they refuse to believe it.”
Yehoshua continues: “All Israeli leaders – from the government to the intelligence services – have become dependent on intelligence information extracted from advanced and complex technology, which has led to a state of laxity and arrogance among those who should have been in a state of constant vigilance.”
Israel Today reported, quoting a senior reserve officer from the Southern Command: “The investigations presented to the Supreme Command and the public were deliberately contaminated by the Chief of Staff and some generals of the General Staff.” “This is the first time that the leaders of the Southern Command have publicly criticized the investigations. According to senior Southern Command officials, the investigation conducted by the Gaza Division has not received sufficient attention, including during the IDF High Command meeting this week.”
Ron Bin Yishai, journalist, also for Yedioth Ahronoth: “The fundamental similarity between the results of the current investigation and the findings of the Salaries Committee, which discussed the failure of the 1973 War of Forgiveness, made me realize that what happened to us 51 years ago from Egypt, and what happened 17 months ago from Gaza, could happen to us again and perhaps more dangerously in 10 or 20 years.”
“The results of the Israeli military investigation demonstrate that the 21st century security and political system has completely ignored the lessons of the October 1973 war, both because these lessons were buried in the stairwells of oblivion and no one took the time to read them, and because the passage of time has weakened their influence. As a result, in October 2023 we had a worse version of the October 73 surprise.”
“However, this time, the attack did not take place more than 120 km from the border, with a geographical barrier such as the Sinai Desert separating us from the enemy; it took place inside our homes. And if it were not for the individual and ingenious initiatives, shown by some leaders and soldiers, Hamas would have reached the Tel Nouf base, the city of Kiryat Ghat and even Ashkelon.”
Ron Bin Yishai continues: “The main cause of the October 2023 disaster is the misconception that prevailed at all levels of government and security about the enemy and ourselves. The intelligence community, especially the Military Intelligence Division, did not understand and did not believe that Hamas wanted and was capable of carrying out a surprise ground attack, accompanied by a fire attack on a broad front, and that this could happen without any warning.”
Yishai: “Hamas gathered intelligence on us to a quality that surpassed ours, because it used less sophisticated means such as social media and field control. It was able to see the full picture of the IDF’s deployment, draw lessons from it, and implement an elaborate strategic trick.”
The Washington Post on an IDF investigation: “A survey reveals a reduction in Hamas’s capabilities assessment before the Oct. 7 attack. Israeli officials met hours before the Oct. 7 attack after monitoring disturbing noises. The Israeli officials concluded that there was no imminent danger and they did not expect the attack.” “Among the reasons for the failure is a failure to understand former Hamas leader Yahya Al-Sinwar.”
Pro-Lebanese social media accounts wrote: “The Chief of Staff of the Israeli army, Herzi Halevi, met on February 28 with residents of the southern cover of the Gaza Strip’s cover settlements and informed them of the results of the investigation into the October 7 attack and stressed the importance of the prosperity of the Western Negev in the years to come to emphasize the image of “Israel’s victory” in the war on Gaza.
Antonio Albanese e Graziella Giangiulio
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