The Israeli Alma Center recently published an interesting analysis of Hezbollah’s military-industrial structure in Lebanon, shedding new light on its military operations in Lebanese territory and the related logistics chain.
This document, obviously produced by one of the parties involved, is a useful tool for better understanding the situation.
We offer a brief excerpt, with a link to the full document for a more comprehensive understanding of the subject matter.
At the height of Operation Northern Arrows, in November 2024, the Air Force, led by the Intelligence Directorate, attacked a critical target in Janta, in Lebanon’s Beqa’a Valley region: Hezbollah’s central precision-guided missile production site. Even before that, the area had been attacked by Israel several times (such as in July 2024).
Hezbollah has not abandoned its efforts to produce missiles on Lebanese soil.
On September 26, 2025, the IDF attacked a precision-guided missile production site in the Janta area (likely the same site).
This attack is one of four attacks in the area since the ceasefire in Lebanon went into effect on November 27, 2024.
Besides the fact that these attacks confirm Hezbollah’s continued efforts to establish a national weapons production infrastructure in Lebanon, the broader issue is whether Hezbollah is relying more on localized production than before the war, following a severe blow to its weapons smuggling capabilities.
With the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, Hezbollah lost a significant portion of its smuggling corridor from Iran, both via land convoys from Iran through Iraq and then to Syria and Lebanon, and via air smuggling through Syrian airports.
In Lebanon, the new government also banned Iranian planes from landing at Beirut’s Hariri International Airport, blocking another direct supply route.
Nevertheless, at the same time, the Alma Center has published and continues to publish regularly on Hezbollah’s attempts to continue smuggling by land through Syria and on the attempts and potential to establish alternative supply routes, likely primarily maritime, which are subject to Israeli interdiction efforts.
This new reality has transformed domestic arms production from a complementary requirement for the organization’s capabilities to an existential strategic necessity for the continued strengthening of its forces, in a manner partly reminiscent of Hamas’s transition in the Gaza Strip to a fully-fledged arms industry. Local weapons manufacturing with Iranian support, after smuggling through the Philadelphia Corridor became more difficult (but nevertheless continued).
“In our assessment, Hezbollah is developing a hybrid military-industrial strategy that combines the principles of local production demonstrated by Hamas, but adds efforts to produce advanced, high-end, and precise capabilities (precision missiles, advanced drones, and anti-tank missiles), supported by Iran’s advanced technological expertise.
While these efforts are not new, we believe that, given its regional isolation, Hezbollah will turn to local weapons production on a scale never seen before.
To understand the strategic urgency driving Hezbollah’s industrial expansion for local weapons production, it is first necessary to recognize the fundamental shift in its regional map.
“The collapse of the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 represented a severe strategic blow to the Iranian-Shiite axis.
This event overnight disintegrated much of the supply corridor that served as the main artery for the transfer of advanced weaponry, funding, and strategic depth from Iran to Hezbollah in Lebanon.
For years, Syria under Assad’s rule provided Hezbollah and Iran not only a relatively safe transit route, but also a rear base for operations, storage of advanced weaponry, and training.
The rise of the al-Sharaa regime in Damascus, with its Sunni orientation and clear interest in attracting reconstruction investments from the Gulf states and the West, transformed Syria from a favorable environment into a transit territory hostile to the Shiite axis. Until the fall of Assad, constant Israeli military activity severely strained the smuggling routes, but not to the extent of substantially damaging Hezbollah’s buildup, as evidenced by the size of the organization’s arsenal on the eve of the War of the Iron Swords.
Hezbollah has lost a state ally in Damascus, which effectively linked weapons production lines in both Iran and Syria to Hezbollah’s warehouses (in Syria and Lebanon).
At the same time, pressure on Lebanon’s official entry points has increased in recent months. Beirut International Airport and seaports have become targets of increased Lebanese oversight, and even the Lebanese government, under internal and external pressure, has increased (albeit limited) its efforts to prevent smuggling.
Added to this are the actions of the new regime’s Syrian security forces, who report weekly that they have successfully thwarted smuggling from Syria to Lebanon, primarily in the al-Qusayr area (southwest of Homs, Lebanon’s northeastern border region).
This multi-domain pressure has made all supply routes—land, air, and sea—dangerous and unpredictable for the transfer of complete, large-scale weapons systems.
The convergence of these factors—a land corridor that has significantly (but not completely) collapsed, a new hostile transit state in Syria that regularly intervenes to intercept smuggling attempts to Hezbollah, and the continued disruption of alternative routes—have transformed Hezbollah’s dependence on external supplies from a strategic advantage to a critical vulnerability.
The necessary conclusion for the organization’s leadership is that its concept of strengthening its forces in the current era can no longer rely on vulnerable external logistics.
Hence the clear strategic necessity: shifting the center of gravity from smuggling to production.
The new situation requires Hezbollah to “bring the factory home” to Lebanon, and to understand that the ability to produce weapons locally is the primary guarantee of its future as a significant military force and as a proxy for Iran.
Antonio Albanese e Graziella Giangiulio
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